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          Training programs are a major tool of labor market policies in OECD 
countries. I use a unique panel data set on the labor market experience of 
individual German workers between 2000 and 2002 to estimate a dynamic 
model of search and training, which allows me to quantify the impact of 
training programs and unemployment benefits on employment, unemployment, 
output, and the government expenditures. 
     The model extends Ljungqvist and Sargent (JPE, 1998) by incorporating a 
training decision and a broader menu of unemployment benefits. Government-
sponsored training programs feature a key trade-off with respect to 
unemployment insurance programs: they offer more generous unemployment 
benefits but require more time and effort from workers to generate higher 
skills. As a result, unemployed workers with different human capital and 
benefits make different decisions about training, search, and job acceptance. 
     I use the model to quantitatively study the recent reforms implemented in 
Germany and run more counterfactual experiments. I simulate the transition 
path under back-to-back unexpected reforms in 2003-2006 and find the 
dynamics of the model's unemployment rates are close to the data. In a 
counterfactual experiment in which I model an economy with a German-like 
training system and a US-like unemployment benefit structure (roughly, 
benefits are lower), I find that employment and output rise substantially.   
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Training for unemployed workers is extensively used in the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) countries. As shown in Table 1, its expenditure accounts
for about 20 percent to 50 percent of the total expenditure on active labor-market policies
among the 10 OECD countries that most expensively used active labor-market policies in
2002.1 By improving workers' human capital, training programs intend to help bring unem-
ployed workers back into work. While microeconomic studies focus on the e®ects of training
on individual employment probabilities and wage earnings (e.g., Heckman, LaLonde and
Smith (1999) for a comprehensive review on evaluation of di®erent training programs2), the
e®ects of these large-scale government-sponsored programs on the aggregate unemployment
rate, employment rate, and output are still not well understood. Furthermore, one important
institutional feature in several OECD countries3 is that training programs and unemployment
insurance programs, which are usually considered the two most important active and passive
labor-market polices,4 are not separated but highly interactive with each other. For instance,
in Germany, training participation used to bring extra bene¯ts to unemployed workers by
extending their maximum bene¯t entitlement duration or increasing the level of their bene¯ts
received in training programs.5 While several recent reforms in the German labor market
gradually cut this link and tightened the unemployment bene¯t structure for unemployed
workers, the e®ects of these reforms on workers' training participation and the economy's
unemployment, employment, and output have not been studied. Therefore, in this paper I
develop and estimate a structural framework to analyze and quantify these macroeconomic
e®ects.
I extend Ljungqvist and Sargent's model (JPE, 1998) in which workers' human capital
varies stochastically (but exogenously) with labor-market experience to introduce training
decisions and add a menu of more realistic unemployment bene¯ts. Government-provided
training programs feature a key trade-o® with respect to unemployment insurance programs:
they o®er more generous replacement rates but require more time and e®ort to improve
workers' skills. Thus, unemployed workers with di®erent human capital levels and bene¯t
entitlements make di®erent training, search, and job acceptance decisions. The variety of
choices provides us with a useful strategy for identifying key structural parameters of the
model through the observed distribution of workers among labor-market states (working,
searching, training), labor-market transitions across these states, and wage earnings condi-
tional on di®erent labor-market experience.
I apply the Simulated Method of Moments to estimate the model, using a recently released
1Active labor market policies are designed to help increase the probability that the unemployed ¯nd jobs
or increase the underemployed' productivity and earnings, such as training programs, subsidized employment,
youth measures, and measures for the disabled.
2Examples of more recent studies on the e®ects of training programs on unemployed workers' employment
probability and wage earnings in several OECD countries include Sianesi (2004), Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch
(2005a, 2005b), Biewen, Fitzenberger, Osikominu and Waller (2006), Fitzenberger, Osikominu and VÄ olter
(2006), Fitzenberger, and VÄ olter (2007), Lechner and Melly (2007).
3For example, in Germany and Sweden.
4Table 1 shows the expenditure and participation in°ows for these two biggest labor market policies for
selected OECD countries.
5Details on German training and unemployment insurance programs are described in the next section.
2Table 1: Training Programs for Unemployed Workers in OECD Countries (2002)
EXPENDITURE PARTICIPATION
COUNTRY Training UB Total LMP Training Training+UB Training UB
(GDP %) (GDP %) (GDP %) (ALMP %) (LMP%) (LF %) (LF %)
Denmark 0:67 1:37 4:6 48:2 44:1 5:8 19:6
Belgium 0:19 1:94 3:6 16:7 58:4 3:4 -
Netherlands 0:52 1:72 3:6 29:5 62:9 1:4 5:2
Germany 0:32 2:10 3:3 27:1 73:1 1:2 -
Finland 0:27 1:53 3:1 27:6 58:6 2:5 -
France 0:21 1:39 2:9 16:7 54:8 1:7 7:1
Sweden 0:28 1:04 2:5 20:1 53:9 2:5 -
Spain 0:12 1:55 2:4 15:6 69:0 2:2 1:6
Switzerland 0:12 0:77 1:3 23:1 68:5 1:7 11:2
United States 0:03 0:55 0:7 20:0 81:7 0:9 -
LMP - Labor Market Policies; ALMP - Active Labor Market Policies;
UB - Unemployment Insurance Bene¯ts; LF - Labor Force
Note: Data for Denmark is from 2000; France and United States' data are from 2001.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2004)
German administrative data set, the Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS),
which is a unique data set containing detailed information on workers' employment histories,
wages and bene¯ts, training-participation records, and job-search information. To circumvent
the computational di±culty of the optimization problem with nonsmooth objective function
and local optima, I apply a recent approach by Chernozhukov and Hong (2005), which is
based on the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.
The model is used to study the actual reforms in Germany and to run a series of counter-
factuals. Both the long-run e®ects (steady states) of three actual reforms and the transitions
between and following them are explored. Some selected ¯ndings follow.
First, I ¯nd a reform like the one implemented in Germany in 2005 (which reduced the
extra bene¯ts only for unemployed workers in training programs) decreases training enroll-
ment by 69 percent in the long run. More workers search for a job, instead of training,
and the proportion of low-skilled unemployed workers increases. As a result, the unemploy-
ment rate rises by almost one percentage point, while the employment rate decreases by 0.2
percentage point, and output falls by 1.7 percentage points. In contrast, a reform like the
one implemented in 2006 (which reduced the maximum bene¯t duration for all unemployed
workers) doubles training enrollment in the long run. The unemployment rate falls by 1.3
percentage points, the employment rate rises by 0.3 percentage point, and output increases
by 2.4 percentage points. Thus, these two reforms enacted in Germany within a year were in
marked contrast with each other.
Second, when the transition path under back-to-back unexpected reforms in 2003-2006 is
simulated, the dynamics of the model's unemployment rates between and after these reforms
3(2003-2008) are very close to the actual path for Germany's unemployment as shown in the
data, suggesting that large-scale labor-market policy reforms can have important e®ects on
aggregate outcomes.
Third, in a counterfactual experiment in which an economy with a German training
system and US-like unemployment bene¯t structure is modeled, the unemployment rate falls
by over 7 percentage points, the employment rate increases by 5 percentage points, and
output increases by 9.9 percentage points. Hence, an injection of elements of the US system
into the German system has large e®ects on the performance of the German labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. The remaining part of this section brie°y reviews the
related literature and the contribution of this paper to the literature. Section 2 provides a
overview of the German training programs and unemployment insurance programs. Section 3
describes the data used in the estimation and lists some important facts observed in the data
which motivate the model setup. Section 4 lays out the model and de¯nes the equilibrium.
Section 5 is a discussion about the calibration and estimation of the model. The estimation
results are shown in Section 6. In Section 7 there are a series of quantitative policy analysis
using the estimated model. In Section 8 the conclusion is presented as well as future research
that will be undertaken. Section 9 contains the appendix.
1.1 Related Literature and Contribution
This paper is related and contributes to the existing literature in the following dimensions.
First, the theoretical part of the model is built on the search model with human capital
developed by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). They established a search model in which work-
ers are heterogeneous in human capital levels and unemployment compensation entitlements.
Workers su®er stochastic human capital loss at layo® times. Low-skilled unemployed workers
entitled to generous unemployment compensation have less incentive to search. Their model
is able to explain why the di®erence in the unemployment rates between European countries
and the U.S. was small in the 1970s but large in the 1990s. They did this by exploiting the
fact that European countries have much higher unemployment compensation bene¯ts than
the U.S. and the increase of \turbulence" (the probability workers lose human capital at
layo® times) in the 1990s.6 Their model highlights the importance of generous unemploy-
ment compensation and the changes of skills on workers' job-search decisions, and provides
a natural platform to introduce the labor-market polices related to workers' human capital,
such as training programs.7
I extend their model by including training decisions and adding a menu of more realistic
unemployment bene¯ts, thus provide a uni¯ed framework to study both training programs
(i.e., the active type of labor-market policy) and unemployment insurance policies (i.e., the
passive type of labor-market policy). The model can be used to evaluate the labor-market
policy portfolio instead of only one single policy, which is quite important considering these
labor-market policies are interacting with each other. By taking a structural approach,
I am able to study both the long-run (steady states) and short-run (transitional periods)
macroeconomic e®ects of a series of recent labor-market reforms (on unemployment bene¯t
6For detail explanations on the turbulence theory, see Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007, 2008).
7As Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) shows, this framework can also be extended to a general equilibrium
setup by including the production side and a matching feature.
4structure and training policies) in Germany.8 In addition, the model can provide important
policy suggestions by running a serials of counterfactual policy experiments.
The model is also estimated by using a recently released German administrative data set.
The key feature of this framework is an unobservable variable, human capital, which drives
workers' di®erent decisions at di®erent labor-market states. Thus the most important pa-
rameters are those governing human capital transitions. By linking the unobservable human
capital to the observed workers' decisions and wage earnings conditional on di®erent labor
market experience, the estimation uncovers these parameters by matching model generated
moments with the data statistics. To my knowledge, this is the ¯rst work to use the micro
data to estimate such a search framework with human capital.
Second, this paper is also related to the literature which applies the dynamic contract
approach to the study of optimal unemployment insurance and training policies. There is a a
large body of research that studies the design of the optimal unemployment insurance problem
under di®erent assumptions, which were mainly motivated by Shavell and Weiss' seminar work
(1979).9 More recently, Pavoni (2004) studied the optimal unemployment insurance in the
context of the existence of human capital depreciation. Pavoni and Violante (2007) further
extended this framework to analyze the optimal sequence of di®erent labor-market policies for
unemployed workers, which include training programs. While these papers provided insightful
discussions of the optimal policy design, they are not able to study and quantify the e®ects
of more realistic reforms due to their simpli¯cation assumptions made in the principle-agent
setup. This paper complements this branch of literature by providing positive policy analysis
of unemployment insurance and training programs in a uni¯ed framework.
Third, this paper is also related to the vast of literature on evaluating the training pro-
grams. Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) provided a comprehensive review of the evalu-
ation on di®erent types of training programs. Recently, because of the appearance of several
administrative data sets, several recent studies including Sianesi (2004), Lechner et al. (2005,
2007) and Fitzenberger et al. (2006, 2007) studied the long-run e®ects of training programs
in several OECD countries using the newly developed evaluation tools. Although the econo-
metric approaches and targeted programs may be di®erent, all of these studies focus on the
e®ects of training on individual employment probabilities and wage earnings. Thus the e®ects
of large-scale, government-sponsored training programs on the aggregate unemployment rate
and output have not been well studied. To ¯ll this gap, this paper develops and estimates a
structural search model to analyze and quantify these macroeconomic e®ects.
Thus, this paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this paper
extends the existing literature on labor-market policies by developing a structural framework
to introduce training programs. Second, micro data have been used to to estimate this
framework. Third, the macroeconomic e®ects of training programs on the economy are
studied, which complements the two related branches of literature which focus on the design of
unemployment insurance and training policies and individual employment and wage-earning
e®ects of the training programs.
8The framework is °exible and can also be applied to study the related problem in other OECD countries
with large training programs.
9For example, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) extended Shavell and Weiss (1979) by introducing the pos-
sibility of contingent wage taxes after re-employment. For a review of the literature, see, e.g., Karni (1999)
and Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003).
52 Training Programs and Unemployment Insurance in Ger-
many
Before going to the model, I would like to ¯rst describe the training programs and unemploy-
ment insurance programs in Germany. I chose Germany as the focus of my research because
(1) it is a typical country with large government-sponsored training programs and a generous
unemployment insurance system which ¯ts the interest of this paper, (2) the German labor-
market experienced a series of reforms recently that can be used as real applications of this
model and (3) a high quality administrative data set from Germany was recently released
that enabled me to estimate the structural model for quantitative analysis.
Note that the policies keep changing in Germany. The descriptions in Section 2.1, 2.2
and 2.3 are based on the period 2000-2002, which is the data period I used to estimate my
benchmark economy. I will describe in Section 2.4 the recent policy reforms in Germany
which I will study in the section of policy analysis.
2.1 Training Programs for Unemployed Workers in Germany
Training programs for unemployed workers is the largest active labor-market policy in Ger-
many. The main purpose of these programs is to enhance unemployed workers' human capital
and bring them back to work. Government pays all the training costs.
Generally speaking, all job seekers who have registered personally at the local labor o±ce
(this involves a counseling interview with a caseworker) are eligible for training participa-
tion.10 The training takes place in classrooms and/or practical ¯rms. The length varies
from several weeks to three years depending on the particular training programs in which
the worker participates. Unemployed workers may (1) learn speci¯c skills (such as computer
skills), (2) maintain, update, adjust, and extend professional skills, or (3) improve job-search
skills.
2.2 Unemployment Bene¯ts in Germany
Germany is well known for providing generous unemployment bene¯ts to unemployed workers.
As shown in Table 1, Germany's total expenditure on unemployment bene¯ts (as a ratio
of GDP) ranks ¯rst among the OECD countries. There are two types of unemployment
bene¯ts for unemployed workers: Unemployment Insurance Bene¯t (UI) and Unemployment
Assistance Bene¯t (UA). The level of UI is higher than that of UA. Both bene¯ts are linked to
a worker's previous wage earnings on the job. The former is about 60 percent of a worker's net
previous wage earnings, and the latter about 53 percent. When workers become unemployed,
they ¯rst receive UI. The maximum entitlement duration of UI is ¯nite and is about 19
months on average.11 When UI expires, an unemployed worker continues to receive UA,
which does not expire but will decrease by 3 percent every year.12
10After 2000, the only requirement is this necessity requirement. But in order to receive unemployment
bene¯ts while in a training program, unemployed workers still need to satisfy the working requirement which,
loosely speaking, is the requirement of one year of employment in the last three years.
11In Germany, the maximum entitlement duration of UI depends on age. Older people have a longer
maximum entitlement duration.
12In reality, UA is means tested.
6Unemployed workers entitled to UI and UA also have certain obligations. For instance,
in order to continue receiving unemployment bene¯ts, they cannot turn down a job o®er that
has a wage higher than a certain amount.13
When an unemployed worker is not eligible for UI or UA, he can receive Social Assistance
(SA) from the welfare system. This assistance is based on a °at level (which is about 40
percent of the average wage-earning level) and has no maximum duration.
2.3 Training Participation and Unemployment Bene¯t
An important feature of the German training policy is that unemployed workers in train-
ing programs can receive extra bene¯ts compared with standard unemployment bene¯ts.14
The bene¯t unemployed workers receive is called Income Maintenance (IM). An unemployed
worker who receives IM in training programs can hold his UI entitlement for up to two years.
Since the amount of IM is equal to that of UI (if the worker is entitled to UI), this is equiva-
lent (roughly) to say the worker can extend the UI entitlement in training programs. Second,
for an unemployed worker entitled to UA, the average IM received is greater than the UA,
which means he receives higher UA bene¯ts in training programs. Both bring extra incentive
for unemployed workers to participate in training programs.
2.4 Three Recent Reforms
The above descriptions (in Section 2.2 and 2.3) apply to the policies in the period 2000-
2002. Ever since 2003, Germany has undertaken a series of reforms that gradually changed
these bene¯t policies. For example, after the reform in 2003, the UI entitlement duration
for an unemployed worker was reduced by half of the duration of training programs. An
unemployed worker entitled to UA no longer received any extra bene¯t.15 And since 2005,
receipt of IM no longer extends the UI entitlement quali¯cation period, which means that
unemployed workers receive the same level and same length of unemployment bene¯ts in
training programs. In 2006, the German government reduced the maximum UI entitlement
duration for all unemployed workers, so the maximum length of UI entitlement in training
programs was also reduced.
It is still not clear how these reforms a®ected unemployed workers and the economy in
general. From the micro level, this series of changes may change unemployed workers' training
participation and job-search strategies. From the macro level, these reforms may a®ect the
unemployment rate, the employment rate, and output. These e®ects have partially motivated
this paper on setting up a framework to study these interesting recent policy reforms.
13During the ¯rst three months, the unemployed can reject jobs o®ering less than 80 percent of prior
earnings, and thereafter less than 70 percent until the sixth month of unemployment. After six months, all
job seekers must accept jobs providing net earnings equal to or higher than unemployment insurance bene¯ts.
For reference, see Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst (2006).
14In several other OECD countries such as Sweden, training participation also a®ects unemployed workers'
receipt of unemployment bene¯ts.
15Remember that before 2003, in some programs unemployed workers entitled with UA receive the bene¯t
which has the same amount of UI, which is higher than the UA amount.
73 Data
The data set used in this paper, Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS),
is a recently released German administrative data set which contains all required information
for the use of my estimation. This data set combines spells of the following four di®erent
data sets of the Federal Employment Agency (BA), and thus contains both unemployment
and employment, unemployment insurance, and training information.16
² The IAB employment history (BeH), which contains 12,594,862 spells between 1990
and 2003
² The IAB bene¯t recipient history (LeH), which contains 2,388,627 spells between 1990
and 2004
² The participants-in-measures data (MTG), which contains 238,232 spells between 2000
and 2004
² Data on job search originating from the applicants pool database (BewA), which con-
tains 1,828,266 spells between 2000 and 2004
IEBS was constructed by selecting people born on one of eight designated days of the year
from the sample frame, making this data set a representative 2:2 percent sample of the target
population.
3.1 Sample Selection
I selected the observations for males that fell between January 1, 2000, and December 31,
2002.17 I dropped those observations on people older than 60 on January 1, 2000. This
reduces the possibility of retirement before the end of the selected data set.18 The ¯nal
sample contained 460,131 individuals with a total of 15,536,946 spells.
3.2 Convert Spell Data into Panel Data
The IEBS comes in spells. For each spell, the data contain the employment status, daily wages
if employed, and records on a daily basis of received unemployment bene¯ts, job search, and
participation in active labor-market programs.
To ¯t the model, I converted the data set into a longitudinal form. I set the length of the
model period to be one month. Thus, the selected data covers 36 model periods. I chose the
status on the ¯rst day of each model period as the status throughout this model period. (For
classi¯cation and explanations of labor market states (employment, search, training), please
see Appendix section.)
16With ¯nancial support of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, the FEA has, in 2004, estab-
lished a Research Data Centre (FDZ) to facilitate access to and promote labor market research based on its
data (Kohlmann, 2005).
17IEBS contains the data from January 1, 2000, and December 31, 2003. I chose the period between January
1, 2000, and December 31, 2002 because during this period the studied policies remained stable.
18Since the data set targets the workers who have labor-market experience, I did not put a low-end cap on
worker's age.
83.3 Observed Facts
In this part I list several important facts observed in the data. These observed facts will
motivate the setup of my model in the next section. Throughout this paper, except for the
calculation of the unemployment rate, I call the workers in training programs unemployed
workers and the period in training programs the unemployment period.





























Figure 1: This ¯gure plots the accepted wages for unemployed workers without training
experience. x axis shows the length of the unemployment spell unemployed workers have
before they become employed. y axis shows the average daily wages. The blue circles are the
data. Red dashed lines are the corresponding 95% con¯dence intervals.
Fact 1. The average level of the accepted wages decreases with the unemployment length
for unemployed workers without training experience. Figure 1 plots the average accepted
wages for unemployed workers without training experience. x axis shows the length of the
unemployment spell unemployed workers experience before they become employed. y axis
shows the average daily wages. This ¯gure says that unemployed workers' accepted wages
decrease with the unemployment length. There are at least two possible explanations for
it. First, heterogeneity can lead to this change. For example, suppose there are two types
of unemployed workers, high-skilled unemployed workers and low-skilled unemployed work-
ers. If high-skilled workers can earn more (on the job) and leave unemployment faster than
low-skilled workers, the proportion of the low-skilled workers in the unemployment pool will
increase with the length of unemployment spell. This leads to the decrease of the accepted
wages. Second, without heterogeneity, the depreciation of the workers' skills can also lead to
9this. Suppose workers are homogenous at the time they become unemployed and workers'
skill depreciates during the unemployment period. Then, given the same assumption that
high-skilled workers can earn more (on the job) and leave unemployment faster than low-
skilled workers, the accepted wages will decrease with the length of the unemployment spell.
Fact 2. As shown in Table 2, accepted wages increase with the unemployment length for
workers who have extensive training experience (e.g., spending more than 50 percent of unem-
ployment time in training programs), and decrease (but slower than that for workers without
any training experience) for the workers with less training experience (e.g., spending no more
than 50 percent of unemployment time in training programs). This suggests that participat-
ing in training increases the workers' human capital.19
Fact 3. As Table 3 shows, for workers with short unemployment spells (i.e., less than or
equal to 4 months), the average previous wage level before unemployment for the workers
who do not participate in training is higher than that of training participants. This says
that unemployed workers with lower previous wages are more likely to participate in training
programs.
Fact 4. As shown in the Table 4, for workers with long unemployment spells (i.e., larger
than or equal to 1 year), the longer the workers stayed in training programs, the more their
accepted wages increased (as a percentage of previous wages). This says that the longer an
unemployed worker stays in training programs, the greater the likelihood that he can improve
wage earnings in the new job.20
Fact 5. The transition rate per model period (i.e., per month) from training programs to
employment is 25 percent lower than the transition rate from search to employment. This is
shown in Table 7. This means that the probability of being employed is lower during training
periods than it is during the search periods.
Fact 6. The average accepted wages of the workers with unemployment bene¯ts is about
40 percent higher than that of workers without unemployment bene¯ts. It implies that un-
employment compensation entitlement is important in determining workers' accepted wages.
There are at least two possible explanations for this. One is that workers with unemploy-
ment compensation are more patient in their job-search, and thus end up with higher accepted
wages. Another possible explanation is that workers without unemployment compensation
are those who have searched for a job for a long time; thus, their human capital has depreci-
ated a lot, which in turn lowers their accepted wages.
19This can also be seen from the change of the wages conditional on the training experience, as shown in
Table 4.
20Since these workers have been unemployed for a long time, they are more likely low-skilled workers, who
are the main targets of the training programs.
10Table 2: Wage Level by Training Experience (Euros)
Training Intensity
0% · 50% > 50%
2 months 59:6 55:8 47:9
Unemployment 4 months 56:6 53:8 50:9
Length 12 months 45:4 51:5 58:2
18 months 42:6 49:9 61:8
Table 3: Previous Wage by Training Experience (Euros)
Training Intensity
0% · 50% > 50%
2 months 58:5 53:1 46:4
Unemployment 4 months 56:8 53:8 49:9
Length 12 months 51:9 54:4 55:2
18 months 49:7 58:0 54:1
Table 4: Percent of Wage Changes (relative to previous level)
Training Intensity
0% · 50% > 50%
2 months 2:0 5:1 3:1
Unemployment 4 months ¡0:2 ¡0:1 2:0
Length 12 months ¡12:4 ¡5:3 5:4
18 months ¡14:2 ¡14:0 14:3
114 The Model
I extend Ljungqvist and Sargent's search model with human capital (JPE, 1998) to introduce
training decisions and add a more realistic bene¯t structure. In this part, ¯rst I lay out the
elements in the economy and show the timing of the model. Then I describe the decision
problems for each type of workers before I de¯ne the stationary equilibrium.
4.1 Environment
Three Types of Workers In This Economy: There is a continuum of workers with
geometrically distributed life spans. At the beginning of every period, a worker dies with
probability ®. To keep the population constant, I assume that when a workers dies, he
is replaced with a newborn worker who has the lowest human capital level.21 According
to whether workers are employed or not and whether they choose training or job search
when they are unemployed, I divide them into three groups: employed workers, unemployed
workers who search, and unemployed workers who participate in training.22 Workers are risk
neutral and maximize their lifetime utility. There is disutility of search, training and work.
I normalize the disutility of work to be zero.
² Employed Workers An employed worker's wage earning is given by the product of
two components. One is the worker's human capital, h. The other is his wage per unit of
human capital, w. I assume the distribution of w, is exogenously given by F(w). When
a worker meets a wage o®er, it means he gets a w which is drawn from the distribution
F(w).23 By this speci¯cation, high-skilled workers have higher wage earnings than do
low-skilled workers given the same wage o®er. But a low-skilled worker who has a
high wage (per unit of human capital) o®er may have the same (or even higher) wage
earnings as that of a high-skilled worker with a low-wage o®er.
All employed workers need to pay income tax rate ¿0 + ¿. Here I assume ¿ is the part
used by the government to ¯nance the expenditure on the bene¯ts and training cost,
while ¿0 summarizes the remaining part, which is ¯xed in this model.24
An employed worker with human capital h faces the probability ¸(h) that he will be
laid o® in the beginning of the next period.25 When he is laid o®, he is entitled to UI
21In the extenuation part of this paper, I will change this assumption and allow a newborn worker to inherit
part of the human capital from the old.
22Note that in the real economy, workers in training programs may not be counted as unemployed workers.
But for convenience, in this paper (except when noted by special announcement), the unemployment period
includes the time workers spend in training programs. To be consistent with the literature, however, in the
results part of this paper I will exclude those workers in training programs when I report the unemployment
rate.
23Since the focus of this paper is on the supply side, I use this exogenous wage distribution to simplify the
production side. It's interesting, however, to extend the model to include the production side. One possible
way is to introduce the matching and bargaining feature into the model. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007)
for an example.
24Throughout this paper, the tax revenue refers to the part brought by ¿.
25I assume the probability of being laid o® depends on an employed worker's human capital h because I
observe that the average previous wage earnings for unemployed workers is much lower than the average wage
earnings for employed workers.
12bene¯ts. I also allow for on-the-job search. But I assume the new job o®er arriving rate
during every employed period is exogenous, given by ¼J. When a new job o®er arrives,
it means an employed worker receives a w, which is drawn from F(w). An employed
worker with a new job o®er in hand decides whether to accept the new one, stay with
the current one, or quit to become unemployed. When he quits, I assume he is not
eligible to receive unemployment bene¯ts.
² Unemployed Workers Who Search An unemployed worker either chooses search
activity or participates in training programs every period. When he chooses search,
he needs to choose a search e®ort as well. A higher search e®ort means a higher
probability that he ¯nds a job. A higher search e®ort is also associated with a higher
level of disutility. Additionally, he observes whether his human capital depreciates by
the end of this period.
² Unemployed Workers Who Participate in Training When an unemployed worker
chooses to participate in training programs, he needs to choose a training e®ort. A
higher training e®ort means a higher human capital accumulation rate. But like the
search e®ort, higher training e®ort also brings higher disutility. I assume unemployed
workers in training programs may also receive some job o®er every period.26 I use ¼T
to denote the job-o®er arriving rate in the training programs every period.
Three Types of Bene¯ts: Since one important exercise of this paper is to apply the
model to study quantitatively the e®ects of the recent unemployment bene¯t reforms in
Germany on workers' training and search decisions, I set the bene¯t structure in the model as
close as possible to that in the real German economy. So, there are two types of unemployment
bene¯ts: the unemployment insurance bene¯t (UI) and the unemployment assistance bene¯t
(UA). When unemployed workers are not entitled to unemployment bene¯ts, they receive the
social assistance bene¯t (SA) from the welfare system.
² Unemployment Insurance Bene¯t (UI) UI is available to all workers when they
are laid o®. I assume those who voluntarily quit their job are not eligible for UI.27
The UI bene¯t is linked to a worker's previous wage earnings before unemployment.
In the literature, the ratio of the bene¯t to a worker's previous wage earnings is called
the replacement ratio. So I use ´ui to denote the replacement ratio of UI bene¯ts.
With a constant replacement ratio, workers who have higher wage earnings also receive
higher UI bene¯ts when they are unemployed. The UI bene¯t is the highest type of
bene¯t unemployed workers can receive. But the duration of this bene¯t entitlement
is ¯nite. Instead of explicitly specifying the duration of the UI bene¯t entitlement,
I use the expiration rate to characterize this length. I de¯ne the expiration rate as
the probability that an unemployed worker will lose his UI bene¯t in the next period,
conditional on the fact that the worker is currently entitled to it.28 So, for example,
20 months of UI bene¯t entitlement means an expiration rate of 0:05 per month. One
26I allow this because I observed in the data evidence of direct transitions from training to employment.
27Since in the model an employed worker always has the option to keep his old job (when he receives a new
one), he will choose quitting the job only if his human capital becomes high enough that he wants to ¯nd a
better wage o®er. In this case, his current wage earning is actually not low.
28There are two considerations when using this expiration rate. First, by using a constant expiration rate to
13important feature of training programs in Germany is that unemployed workers can
receive UI bene¯ts for longer if they are enrolled in these programs. Thus, I use ±T
ui
to denote the expiration rate of the UI bene¯t for unemployed workers face in training
programs and ±S
ui to denote the expiration rate of the UI bene¯t for unemployed workers
who are searching for a job.
² Unemployment Assistance Bene¯t (UA) When UI expires, an unemployed worker
receives a less generous unemployment bene¯t, UA, which decreases slightly over time.
For the same consideration as described above, I use the expiration rate ±ua to charac-
terize this decreasing feature of the bene¯t. For example, if the UA bene¯t decreases by
5 percent per month, it corresponds to an expiration rate of 5 percent per month, which
means there is a 5 percent chance that an unemployed worker who is entitled to this
bene¯t will lose it in the next month.29 To capture the fact that training brings extra
bene¯ts for unemployed workers entitled to UA, I allow that the replacement ratio of
UA in training programs, ´T




ua measures the extra bene¯ts (as a ratio of previous wage earnings)
that unemployed workers can receive in training programs.
² Social Assistance Bene¯t (SA) When unemployed workers are not eligible to receive
either UI or UA, they can receive social assistance (SA) from the welfare system. This
assistance does not depend on workers' previous wage earnings. Thus, it is a °at rate
that on average is less generous than UI and UA bene¯ts.
Human Capital Dynamics Human capital dynamics is an important feature of this model.
A worker's human capital experiences stochastic accumulation and depreciation during dif-
ferent states. Speci¯cally, during employed periods, a worker's human capital accumulates
according to the transition function ¹e(h;h0); during search periods, a worker's human cap-
ital depreciates according to the transition function ¹u(h;h0); at the layo® time, a worker's
human capital depreciates according to the transition function ¹l(h;h0);30 and when work-
ers attend training programs, their human capital accumulates according to the transition
function ¹T(t;h;h0), where t refers to the training e®ort the worker chooses.
Search Technology A worker chooses the search e®ort continuously in the interval [0;1].
I use ¼(s) to denote the probability of ¯nding a job when a worker chooses the job-search
e®ort s.31 The disutility of the search e®ort is denoted by v(s), with v0(s) > 0;v00(s) > 0.
denote the expected bene¯t duration, I do not need to keep track of how long an unemployed worker has been
receiving this bene¯t. This saves me one state variable which is quite important to the success of estimation
strategy. Second, my assumption about the linear utility of the consumption means the worker cares only
about the expected value of his future bene¯ts; thus, this simpli¯cation will not change the main results of
this paper.
29Notice the di®erence between the interpretation of the UI expiration rate and the UA expiration rate.
The former measures the expected duration of the bene¯t. The latter measures how fast it decreases.
30By using the laid-o® human capital transition function ¹
l(h;h
0), I can check the e®ect of turbulence theory
in this economy later. For example, if transition matrix ¹
l is an identity matrix, it implies no human capital
depreciation happening at the time of layo®; if I let the transition matrix ¹
l be lower-triangle, it means workers
experience some human capital loss upon layo®. In that case, I can study how turbulent economy behaviors
di®er from those in a tranquil economy under di®erent policies. For an explanation of turbulence theory, see
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2007, 2008).
31To focus the e®ect of human capital on wage earnings, I assume workers' human capital doesn't a®ect
their job-¯nding rate. Hence, a high-skilled worker ¯nds it easier to ¯nd a "better" job (i.e., a job with higher
14Training Technology Training accumulates the human capital. A higher training e®ort
means a higher human capital accumulation rate. Speci¯cally, if a worker with human cap-
ital h chooses training e®ort t in the training programs, his human capital becomes h0 with
probability ¹T(t;h;h0) at the end of this period. And the disutility associated with training
e®ort t is d(t).
Government in This Economy The government imposes a proportional income tax on
employed workers. As I will describe below in the section on the employed worker's problem,
I break down this income tax into two parts, ¿ and ¿0. ¿ is to used to ¯nance the expenditure
on three types of bene¯ts paid to workers, as well as the direct training cost.32 ¿0 is ¯xed,
swhich represents all other taxes employed workers face. The government keeps the budget
constraint balanced every period.
4.2 Timing
Figure 2 shows the timing of the model. At the beginning of every period, shocks take
place ¯rst, which means some workers die and some employed workers are laid o®. After
that workers observe how their human capital changes. Basically, workers on the job and in
training programs during the last period may ¯nd that their human capital improves while
workers who were searching in the last period or experienced a layo® at the beginning of this
period may lose part of the human capital. Employed workers then make decisions. Given
that a new job o®er arrives, an employed worker decides whether to switch to the new job,
stay with the current one, or quit to be unemployed. At this time, there are two types of
unemployed workers, according to whether they have a job o®er in hand. An unemployed
worker who receives a job o®er at the end of last period33 decides whether to accept it. An
unemployed worker who does not have any job o®er in hand34 decides whether to participate
in training programs or search for a job.35 In both search and training cases, the worker also
needs to choose an e®ort.36 Finally, workers ¯nd out whether they receive any new job o®ers
at the end of the period.
4.3 Workers' Problems
I will describe the problem of each type of worker according to whether the worker is employed
or not and to which type of bene¯t he is entitled if unemployed.
wage earnings) since wage earnings are given by w times h.
32The direct cost of training refers to the cost aside from the bene¯t payments to the training workers, such
as the expenditure on buying facilities and the salary of the caseworker and teachers in training programs.
33Notice that although the probability of receiving a job o®er depends on whether an unemployed worker
chooses search or training, in both cases he may receive a job o®er.
34These also include those unemployed workers who have just turned down their job o®ers and workers who
were laid o® or quit at the beginning of this period.
35I assume that an unemployed worker can choose either training or search, which may not be true in reality;
the assumption that there are also new job o®ers arriving in training programs re°ects the fact that training
and search are not completely exclusive. What is important is that the job arriving rates may be di®erent
during the search and the training period, which unemployed workers must take this into account in their
decisions.
36Search e®ort and training e®ort play di®erent roles in the model. Search e®ort increases the job-o®er
arriving rate while training e®ort determines the human capital accumulation rate.
15Figure 2: Timing of the Model
Beginning of period t
End of period t
(1) Shocks take place
die
be laid oﬀ
(2) Human capital changes
accumulated on the job and training
depreciate in search periods and laid oﬀ times
(3) Employed workers
accept new job
stay with the current job
quit to be unemployed
(4) Unemployed workers




search (and the search intensity)
training (and the training eﬀort)
(6) Job search outcome realizes
4.3.1 The Problem for an Employed Worker
An employed worker who works with wage w and has human capital h this period earns wh.
Let I denote his after-tax wage earning, i.e., I ´ (1¡¿0¡¿)wh. In the next period, conditional
on not being laid o® or dying, his human capital may change to h0; he may also receive a
new wage o®er, w0. In that case, the worker needs to decide whether to accept the new wage
o®er, to stay in the current job, or to quit and become unemployed. If a worker quits and
becomes unemployed, he is not eligible for UI and therefore receives SA. Let V e(w;h) denote
the value for an employed worker with human capital h who works for this period at wage
w, and let Vsa(h;I) denote the value for an unemployed worker with human capital h who
receives SA. Then the value function for an employed worker is as follows:


















16where V (h0;w0;w) denotes the value for a worker with new human capital h0, new wage o®er
w0 and current wage w.
V (h0;w0;w) = maxfV e(w;h0);V e(w0;h0);Vsa(h0)g (2)
4.3.2 The Problem for an Unemployed Worker with UI
At the beginning of every period, conditional on that he doesn't die, an unemployed worker
with the UI bene¯t chooses whether to search for a job or participate in training programs
during this period. In both cases he has to specify the amount of e®ort he will use. The UI
bene¯t is equal to the replacement ratio ´ui times his after-tax wage earning I. As discussed
in the previous section, the UI expiration rate faced by unemployed workers in training
programs, ±T
ui, is lower than that faced by unemployed workers who search, ±S
ui. In order to
remain eligible for UI in the next period, unemployed workers are not allowed to turn down
"suitable" job o®ers.37 ·~ I is used to measure this criterion, where ~ I is the last wage earnings
of a now unemployed worker. That means if an unemployed worker turns down a wage o®er
that can bring higher wage earnings than ·~ I, he is not eligible to receive UI in the next
period.
Let Vui(h;I), V S
ui(h;I), and V T
ui(h;I) denote the value functions for unemployed workers
who are entitled to UI, unemployed workers who are entitled to UI and choose search activity,
and unemployed workers who are entitled to UI and participate in training, respectively. Then
































ui(h0;I) ´ (1 ¡ ±S
ui)Vui(h0;I) + ±S
uiVua(h0;I) (5)
























ui(h0;I) ´ (1 ¡ ±T
ui)Vui(h0;I) + ±T
uiVua(h0;I) (7)
4.3.3 The Problem for an Unemployed Worker with UA
When UI bene¯ts expire, an unemployed worker receives UA bene¯ts. At the beginning
of every period, the decision faced by an unemployed worker with UA is similar to that of
an unemployed worker with UI. The worker has to choose whether to search for a job or
participate in training programs during this period; in both cases the worker needs to choose
an e®ort level. Similarly, let Vua(h;I), V S
ua(h;I), and V T
ua(h;I) denote the value functions for
unemployed workers who are entitled to UA, unemployed workers who are entitled to UA
and choose search activity, and unemployed workers who are entitled to UA and participate
in training, respectively. The problem faced by an unemployed worker who is entitled to UA




















































18Notice that participation in training programs has di®erent implications for whether one
receives UI and UA. For unemployed workers entitled to UI, training extends the expected
length of their bene¯t entitlement.38 For unemployed workers entitled to UA, training in-
creases the level of their bene¯ts.
4.3.4 The Problem for an Unemployed Worker with SA
When unemployed workers are not eligible for either UI or UA, they receive SA. In this
case, the worker's training participation decision and job acceptance decision do not a®ect
the receipt of the entitled bene¯t in the next period. Let Vsa(h;I), V S
sa(h;I), and V T
sa(h;I)
denote the value functions for unemployed workers entitled to SA, unemployed workers who
search and are entitled to SA, unemployed workers who participate in training and are entitled
to SA, respectively. The problem faced by an unemployed worker entitled to SA is described
by the following Bellman equation.





































4.3.5 Government Budget Constraint
The government uses tax revenue to ¯nance the training costs and the expenditures on




















Á is the average direct training cost per training worker. ¤i
b(I;h) is the invariant distribution
of the worker entitled to unemployment bene¯t b (b = UI;UA) and choosing activity i
(i = S;T); ¤sa(h) is the invariant distribution of the worker entitled to SA.
38This is re°ected by the lower expiration rate in training programs than during the search period.
194.4 Equilibrium
A Recursive Stationary Equilibrium consists of a set of government policies f¿;¿0;·;´i
b;±i
b;SAg
(where b = UI;UA; i = S;T), workers' decision rules on search, training and job o®er accep-
tance (at di®erent labor market status), and time-invariant distribution, such that:
² Given the government's policies, workers' decision rules solve workers' problems de¯ned
by equations (1) ¡ (14).
² The associated time-invariant distribution is consistent with workers' optimal decisions.
² The government's budget constraint (15) holds for every period.
5 Calibration and Estimation
To solve the model quantitatively, I need to specify the human capital transition function,
wage o®er distribution, search and training disutility function and the function of the job
¯nding rate in the search period.
Human Capital Transition Probabilities. Human capital may depreciate at layo® times
and in search periods, and accumulate during employment periods and in training programs.
I assume there are only two levels of human capital: a high level, hH = 2, and a low level,
hL = 1. The human capital transition functions in each labor market state are described as
follows.
During an employment period, a low-skilled worker has the probability ¹e of updating his
skill level to the high level.39 A high-skilled worker does not lose his human capital during
the employment period. Therefore the human capital transition is given by the following
transition matrix. µ
1 ¡ ¹e ¹e
0 1
¶
In a training period, the probability of upgrading the human capital for a low-skilled worker
depends on his e®ort. I assume there are only two training e®orts a worker can choose, a high
level and a low level.40 The probabilities that human capital changes from the low level to the
high level at the low training e®ort and the high training e®ort are ¹tl and ¹th, respectively.
A high-skilled worker doesn't lose his human capital in the training period. Thus the human
capital transition matrices associated with the low training e®ort and the high training e®ort
are given as follows: µ




1 ¡ ¹th ¹th
0 1
¶
39In this paper workers' skill and workers' human capital refer to the same thing.
40The main consideration of only using two training e®ort levels is to not introduce a human capital produc-
tion function, which describes how training e®ort a®ects human capital accumulation, since I haven't found a
good candidate in the literature for such a human capital production function.
20In every search period, a high-skilled worker's human capital depreciates with the prob-
ability ¹u. A low-skilled worker's human capital does not depreciate. So the human capital
transition matrix in the search period is as follows:
µ
1 0
¹u 1 ¡ ¹u
¶
When an employed worker is laid o®, with probability ¹l a high-skilled worker loses part
of his human capital and becomes a low-skilled worker. A low-skilled worker's human capital
doesn't change at layo® time. The human capital transition matrix is as follows:
µ
1 0
¹l 1 ¡ ¹l
¶
So in total I use 5 parameters to summarize these di®erent human capital transitions.
Wage O®er Distribution The wage (per human capital level) associated with a job o®er fol-
lows a normal distribution N(¹w;¾w), which is truncated between 0 and 1:5.41
Disutility Function for Job Search The function form of the job search disutility is taken from
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007). The disutility associated with a search e®ort level, s, is given
by the function c(s) = A
1¡(1¡s)°
° .
Disutility for Training E®orts Since there are two di®erent training e®ort levels, the associ-
ated disutilities are d(tL) and d(tH), where tL and tH refer to the low and high training e®ort
levels, respectively.
Function for Job-Finding Rate in the Search Period An unemployed worker's job-¯nding rate
in the search period depends on his search e®ort. The function on this job ¯nding rate is
¼(s) = Bs», which is a more general version of the function form used in Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2007).42
5.1 Calibration of the Parameters
I divide the model parameters into two groups. In the ¯rst group, the values of the parameters
are chosen directly to match their counterparts in the data or the corresponding labor-market
policies. In the second group, the parameters cannot be calibrated separately and thus I
estimate them jointly.
The ¯rst group of parameters include the probability a worker dies every period, ®, the
discount rate, ¯, the replacement ratio of UI, ´ui, and the expiration rates of UI in the search
period and the training period, ±S
ui;±T
ui, the replacement ratios of UA in the search period and
the training period, ´S
ua;´T
ua, and the expiration rate of UA, ±ua, social assistance level, SA,
41The density is adjusted correspondingly to ensure that it is a proper density function after the truncation.
42Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) used ¼(s) = s
» in their quantitative analysis.
21Table 5: Calibrated Values of Model Parameters
Paramter Notation Value Source and Moments to Match
probability workers die every period ® 0:0021 43 years of working life
discount factor ¯ 0:9967 annual risk-free interest rate of 4:02%a
suitable earning level (e(I) = · ¢ I) · 0:7 OECD (2003)
UI replacement ratio ´ui 0:60 OECD (2003)
UA replacement ratio (search period) ´s
ua 0:53 OECD (2003)
UA replacement ratio (training period) ´Tr
ua 0:575 OECD (2003)
UI expiration rate every search period ±s
ui 0:052 maximum UI entitlement duration of 19:3
months in search periods (Wunsch, 2005)
UI expiration rate every training period ±Tr
ui 0:023 maximum UI entitlement duration of 43
months in training periods (Wunsch, 2005)
UA expiration rate every period ±ua 0:0025 decreases by 3% per year OECD (2003)
monthly training cost per participantb Á 0:59 IZA Research Report (2005)
income tax rate (the ¯xed part) ¿0 0:35 the total tax rate (¿ + ¿0) is about 40%
aThis is the average value of the term structure of interest rates on listed Federal securities residual maturity
of 1 years between 2000 and 2002. (Data source: Bundesbank, Germany, 2008).
bThis is the direct training cost besides the unemployment compensation paid to the participants.
the parameter on the suitable wage earnings level, ·, the direct training cost per participant,
Á, the income tax rate for employed workers (the ¯xed part), ¿0.
Table 5 reports the values of these parameters and the moments they calibrate to. ® is
chosen to be 0:0021 so the average working life of a worker in the model is 43 years.43 The
discount rate, ¯, is chosen to match the average risk-free rate during 2000¡2002 in Germany.
Other policy parameters are directly translated from the German labor-market policies. The
average training cost, Á, is chosen to match the average training cost per participant as a
ratio of the average wages over the same period.
5.2 Estimation
The second group includes the following 17 parameters.
² the human capital transition probabilities f¹e, ¹u, ¹tl;¹th;¹lg
² the probabilities workers are laid o® (for both low-skilled and high-skilled workers)
¸(L);¸(H)
² job-o®er arriving rate in training programs ¼T
² job-o®er arriving rate on the job ¼J
² parameters on the job-o®er arriving rate in search period, B, »
² parameters on search disutility function, A, °
43In the data I chose workers whose ages are below 63 at year 2003. I assume the average ages when workers
enter the labor market is 20. So the average working life is about 43 years.
22² parameters on training disutility, d(tL), d(tH)
² parameters on wage o®er distribution, ¹, ¾
Since they cannot be calibrated separately, I apply Simulated Method of Moments to es-
timate them jointly. The moments I use in the estimation process include wage earnings mo-
ments conditional on workers' labor market experience (i.e., unemployment length, training
experience, bene¯t entitlements), statistics on wage earning distribution, transitions among
di®erent market states, distribution of workers over di®erent labor-market states and bene¯t
entitlements. In total, the 17 parameter values are chosen to match 36 selected moments in
the estimation procedure.
To explain which moments I chose and why these moments are informative to identify the
model parameters, let me ¯rst explain how the parameters are linked to the model moments.
Figure 3 presents a graphic view of the model structure and how each parameter a®ects the
worker's decision, the transitions (across di®erent labor-market states) and distributions in
the model. According to the di®erent labor-market status, the economy can be thought of
as an economy with three real \islands": employment island (E), search island (S), training
island (T) and one intermediate island, nonemployment island (U).44 Every period we can
\see" workers are moving among di®erent islands. The model parameters which I labeled
on the graph are the di®erent forces which drive workers to move.45 For example, the layo®
probabilities ¸(L);¸(H) a®ect the transition rate from E island to U island.46 A larger layo®
probability leads to a higher transition rate from employment island to nonemployment island
every period. If the parameters on ¼(s) imply the job search technology is now more e®ective,
the transition from S to E and also from U to S (or from E to S) will increase. Similarly an
increase in the job ¯nding rate in the training programs, ¼T, increases the transition from T
to E, and an increase of human capital accumulation rates, ¹tl and ¹th, will increase both the
transition from T to S and T to E. If the human capital depreciation rate (i.e., ¹u) increases,
the transition from S to T will also increase.
The transition rates from U to S and T are a®ected by two factors. One is the distribution
of low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers in U island, since low-skilled workers are more
likely to participate in training and high-skilled workers prefer job-search. This distribution is
driven by the di®erence between the layo® probability that of low-skilled workers, ¸(L), and
that of high-skilled workers', ¸(H), and the probability high-skilled worker's human capital
depreciates at the layo® time, ¹l. For example, if ¸(L) or ¹l increases, which increases the
proportion of low-skilled workers in U island, it increases the transition from U to T island.
The second factor is the search and training technology. For instance, given the distribution of
low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers and bene¯t entitlements, if the search technology
is more e®ective, more workers will choose search. Similarly, if training technology is more
e®ective, more workers will choose training. And all these transitions and individual decisions
44The reason I call the nonemployment island (U) an intermediate island is that workers only temporarily
stay there and go to other islands. For example, when an employed worker is laid o®, the worker ¯rst comes
to U island before he makes the decision whether to go to S island or T island in this period.
45These actually include exogenous moves and endogenous moves. For example, when an employed worker
receives an exogenous layo® shock, he is exogenously sent from E island to U island. But when he decides
whether to go to S island or T island, this is actually an endogenous move, which is decided by the worker
himself.
46The transition rate from E to U is the sum of the transition rates from E to S and from E to T.



















E – Employment; U – Out of Work; S – Search; T – Training
24will lead to the equilibrium distribution of workers in each island. So, one important strategy
I exploit here is to use these observed transitions and distributions to help identify part of
the unobserved parameter values.
Besides transitions and distribution moments, the second group of moments I used are
(conditional and unconditional) moments on the wage earnings. One important feature of this
model is that human capital is unobservable and varies with labor market experience. These
changes in human capital not only lead to a worker's di®erent search and training decisions
but also job acceptance decisions. Since wage earnings contain important information on
workers' human capital, checking how workers' wage earnings change with their labor market
experience helps identify several important parameters. This thus also helps identify other
parameters.
Particularly, I use the average wage earnings moments for those unemployed workers
who never participate in training programs conditional on the length they have been un-
employed. Given that high-skilled workers leave unemployment faster and workers' human
capital depreciates during the search period, these wage earning moments decrease as the
unemployment lengthens. In the model, the human capital depreciation rate, ¹u, drives how
fast these wage-earning moments decrease. In addition, the level of the wage-earning re°ects
the average human-capital level among these unemployed workers. As I explained in previ-
ous paragraphs, the proportion of low-skilled workers on island U is mainly driven by the
parameters ¸(L);¸(H) and ¹l. To further help distinguish them, I use the average last wage
earnings for unemployed workers before they are unemployed. Notice this does not depend
on the human capital transition probability at layo®, ¹l, but re°ects the di®erence between
the layo® probability of low-skilled workers, ¸(L), and that of high-skilled workers, ¸(H).47
This thus helps identify ¸(L);¸(H) and ¹l.
I use the average wage growth rates for employed workers to help identify the human
capital accumulation rate on the job, ¹e. This also puts restriction on the human capital
accumulation rate on the training programs because when unemployed workers make training
participation decisions, they not only take into account the human capital accumulation rate
on the training programs but also that on the job. The faster the human capital accumulates
on the job, the more incentive the unemployed workers have to become employed faster (by
searching hard and reducing their reservation wages).
To sum up, the second group of parameters are jointly estimated to match the wage
earnings conditional on workers' unemployment experience, statistics on wage earning distri-
bution, the distribution of workers over di®erent labor-market states and bene¯t entitlements,
and transitions among di®erent market states by Simulated Method of Moments. To circum-
vent the non-smooth and local optima problem in the computation of classical extremum
estimators, I apply a recent approach proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2005). They de-
velop a class of Laplace Type Estimators (LTE) which can be implemented by Markov Chain
Monte Carlo simulations. The estimation details are listed in the Appendix. The estimated
parameter values and matched moments are reported in Table 6, Table 7 and Figure 5 in the
next section.
47It is also determined by the distribution of human capital among those who quit their jobs. But the
number of these workers is quite small in the model.
256 Estimation Results
The estimated values of the parameters are reported in Table 6. The top panel reports
the human capital transition probabilities at di®erent labor market statuses. It shows that
during the search period, a high-skilled unemployed worker's human capital depreciates (to
the low level) with probability 0:1 every period. That means on average he loses 5 percent
of his human capital every search period.48 For a low-skilled worker who participates in
training programs, the average probability that his human capital improves to the high level
is 0:055 if he uses the average training e®ort. This means every period the human capital
improves by 5.5 percent (on average) for a low-skilled worker in training programs. The
human-capital accumulation rate on the job is about 30 percent of the average rate in the
training programs. The estimation shows that the probability that a high-skilled worker's
human capital depreciates at layo® times is very high. It implies that high-skilled workers
on average lose 28 percent of their human capital when they are laid o®. This looks a little
surprising, but it is consistent with the fact that after unemployment, workers' average wage
earnings are much lower than their wage earnings on their last jobs. In reality, this large
di®erence can be caused by many di®erent things, such as loss of job tenure, the loss of the
¯rm speci¯c skill, occupation-speci¯c reasons, and deterioration of job opportunities after
layo®. But in the model all these e®ects are summarized by the e®ect of the common factor,
human capital. That is why the model generates a very high probability that human capital
depreciates at layo® time.
The middle part of Table 6 shows the parameters values on the disutility function of search
e®ort and the disutilities for di®erent training e®orts. It shows that the disutility associated
with high training e®ort is very high. Actually, it is twice as much as the disutility brought
by the average search e®ort level in the economy.49 But this high disutility with the high
training e®ort is compensated by the high human capital accumulation rate. The estimation
shows another important trade-o® between training and search: the job-o®er arriving rate
in training programs is much lower than that in the search period. Actually the parameters
imply a 10 percent of full the search e®ort can bring the same job-o®er arriving rate as that
in training programs. These results highlight the important trade-o® unemployed workers
need to take into account when they make training participation decisions: training improves
human capital but it requires higher e®ort and the job-o®er arriving rate in the training
period is lower than in the search period.50 As shown at the bottom of the table, low-skilled
workers face a much higher probability of being laid o® than high-skilled workers face. This
large di®erence is generated in the model to match the large di®erence between the average
previous earnings for unemployed workers and the average earnings for employed workers.
Given these parameter values, Figure 4 shows the search and training decisions for work-
ers with di®erent human capital levels and unemployment bene¯t entitlements. It says high-
skilled workers choose search and the search e®ort level decreases with the entitled bene¯t
48Since the high human capital level is 2 and the low human capital level is 1, a 0:1 probability of transiting
from high human capital to low human capital means a 5% human capital depreciation.
49The computation results show that the average search e®ort in the benchmark economy is less than 0:3,
which leads to a disutility level of 1:0.
50A lower job-o®er arriving rate in training programs can be interpreted as the result of less time for workers
in training programs to search for jobs. In other words, training takes time to improve human capital, which
prevents unemployed workers from actively searching for jobs.
26Table 6: Estimated Values of the Model Parameters
Paramters on human capital transitions
skill depreciation rate during searching periods ¹u 0:0997
skill accumulation rate at high training e®ort ¹th 0:1087
skill accumulation rate at low training e®ort ¹tl 0:0005
skill accumulation rate on the job ¹e 0:0169
probability of transiting from high-skilled to low skill at layo® time ¹l 0:5523
Disutility (per model period) for search and training activities
search disutility function (c(s) = A
1¡(1¡s)
°
° ) A 2:9794
° 0:3491
disutility for low training e®ort d(tL) 1:1918
disutility for high training e®ort d(tH) 1:9710
Job arriving rates conditional on di®erent activities
in search period (¼(s) = Bs») B 0:2277
» 0:7259
in training programs ¼T 0:0426
on the job ¼J 0:0057
Other parameters
laid-o® probability for low skill ¸(L) 0:0158
laid-o® probability for high-skilled ¸(H) 0:0054
mean of wage distribution ¹w 0:9902
standard deviation of wage o®er distribution ±w 0:1412

































































Training and Search Decisions 





















Figure 4: This ¯gure shows the training and search decisions for workers with di®erent human
capital levels and bene¯t entitlements (UI and UA). The x axis shows workers' previous wage
earnings (UI and UA are equal to their replacement ratios times the workers' previous wage
earnings), y axis shows the search e®ort level and training decisions.
level. When the entitled bene¯t level is low, low-skilled workers search and choose relatively
high e®ort level. As the entitled bene¯t level increases, low-skilled workers prefer to train-
ing. And when the entitled bene¯t is very high, they will choose low search e®ort level.
These policy functions show that a very low level of unemployment bene¯t discourages train-
ing participation while a very high level of unemployment bene¯t discourages both training
participation and job-search.
6.1 Model Fit
Table 7 and Figure 5 compare the moments generated by the model and the corresponding
statistics in the data.51 The model generates a distribution (of workers in di®erent labor-
market status) very close to the one shown in the data. The proportion of employed workers
in the data is 86:4 percent and in the model it is 86:3 percent. There are 12:2 percent of
workers who search in the data, and in the model this ¯gure is 12:4 percent. The model
generates 1:3 percent of workers in training programs, while in the data it is 1:4 percent. The
model matches almost exactly the proportion of workers entitled to UI, UA and SA bene¯ts
51These are the moments I chose to be matched. As explained in the previous section, in total I use 17
parameters to match 36 moments.
28as shown in the data.
The transitions among di®erent labor-market states in the model are also close to that
in the data. But compared with other fairly well matched transitions, the model generates a
much lower transition from search to training than that in the data. One possible explanation
is that unemployed workers can choose whether to participate in training program. In reality,
although the current training programs policies in Germany say the only requirement for
participation is the necessity requirement52, which means workers who need the training
programs should be eligible, the evaluation process is usually done by a caseworker. It is
possible that there are some workers who are \recommended" to participate in training even
when they do not want to do so.53 This will increase the transitions from search to training
programs in the data.
Table 7: Moments Matched
Moments Model Data
Distribution
employment rate 0:8627 0:8640
proportion of people who search 0:1243 0:1222
proportion of people who take training 0:0130 0:0141
proportion of people entitled with UI 0:0591 0:0586
proportion of people entitled with UA 0:0273 0:0274
proportion of people entitled with SA 0:0509 0:0503
Transitions
from employment to unemployment 0:0091 0:0104
from search to employment 0:0642 0:0622
from search to training 0:0103 0:0206
from training to employment 0:0418 0:0464
from training to search 0:1073 0:1175
Other wages statistics
wage growth rate on the job 0:0062 0:0078
coe±cient of variation 0:5140 0:4568
average previous wages 0:8417 0:7200
average wages conditional on (previous) bene¯t entitlement and activities
Search + UI 0:7080 0:7430
Training + UI 0:6187 0:7097
Search + UA 0:6886 0:5784
Training + UA 0:5982 0:5909
Figure 5 shows the wage earnings for unemployed workers who never participate in train-
ing programs (in the current unemployment spell) conditional on the unemployment length54
52For the details see Conny Wunsch (2005), for example.
53Before 2000, some unemployed workers were required to participate in certain active programs to be
eligible for unemployment bene¯ts.
54In this case, the unemployment length is the total number of search periods.
29Figure 5: Earning Moments Conditional on Unemployment Length
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in the data and the model. The x axis is the length of unemployment measured in the number
of model periods. The y axis is the ratio of the average wage earnings of the unemployed
workers at the time they ¯nd a job to the average wage earnings of employed workers. For
instance, a pair of values of (x;y), (2;0:75), means for all the unemployed workers who never
participate in training programs and become employed after two periods of search, the aver-
age earning at the time they accept their jobs is 75 percent of the average level of all employed
workers. As shown in the data (the squares in the ¯gure), the longer the workers search, the
lower the wage earnings they end up with. Given the same wage o®er distribution workers
face every period, this means the average human capital decreases as the unemployment spell
stretches.55 So, as explained before, these conditional wage earning moments contain impor-
tant information on both the human-capital depreciation rate and the initial distribution of
workers' human capital when they enter unemployment. This ¯gure shows that the model
successfully matches these conditional wage earnings.
55But notice there are two reasons accounting for this change of average human capital level. First, it is
because of the heterogeneity. That is, unemployed workers' human capital levels already di®er at the time they
become unemployed. Since high-skilled workers leave unemployment faster than low-skilled workers, as unem-
ployment length increases, the proportion of low-skilled workers in the unemployment pool increases. Second,
it is because of the duration dependence. That is, since unemployed workers' human capital depreciates, the
average human capital level decreases (no matter whether heterogeneity exists or not) as unemployment length
increases.
307 Policy Analysis
Given the structural model has matched the data in di®erent important dimensions, I am able
to use it to do the following four types of policy analysis. First, I apply the model to study
the actual reforms implemented in Germany in 2003, 2005, and 2006. I will quantitatively
investigate how these reforms a®ect the workers' training participation and how these reforms
a®ect the unemployment rate, the employment rate, and the output in the long run. Second,
I use the model to simulate the transition dynamics between and after these reforms. Third,
I will do a series of counter-factual experiments to explore the macroeconomic e®ects of
alternative policies on the economy. Fourth, I use the structure model to study the e®ects of
training on the employment probability and wage earnings of the unemployed workers.
7.1 Studying the Actual Reforms in Germany
Table 8 compares the main aggregate statistics in the steady states of di®erent economies.
The ¯rst four columns compare the benchmark economy (which corresponds to Germany
between 2000 and 2002) with the economies with the new policies implemented under the
reforms in 2003, 2005 and 2006 in Germany. (I label these three reforms as Reform 1, Reform
2 and Reform 3 in the table and also below.)
Table 8: Comparison of the Steady States of Di®erent Economies
Benchmarka Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3 No Training Training No Training
(2000-02) (2003) (2005) (2006) (2006) U.S.b U.S.
percent of
Unemp.c 12:6 13:2 13:5 11:3 13:7 5:3 8:9
Employ. 86:3 86:1 86:1 86:6 86:3 91:2 91:1
percent of
Training 1:3 0:8 0:4 2:4 0:0 3:7 0:0
Searching 12:4 13:0 13:5 11:0 13:7 5:1 8:9
UI 5:9 6:1 6:0 4:6 5:0 2:7 2:9
UA 5:1 5:1 5:2 5:9 5:9 0:0 0:0
SA 2:7 2:7 2:7 2:9 2:7 6:1 6:0
Welfare 100:0 100:0 100:1 100:0 100:5 103:5 104:2
Output 100:0 99:0 98:3 102:4 97:7 109:9 103:0
Tax (%) 5:4 5:3 5:2 5:6 4:9 2:7 1:5
aThe benchmark economy corresponds to Germany between 2000 and 2002.
bThe U.S. economy is described by a UI replacement ratio of 0:6, maximum duration of 6 months, no UA
bene¯t and a SA level equal to 25% of average net wage earning.
cThe unemployment rate is calculated as the percent of searching workers among all the workers except those
in training programs.
The ¯rst column shows the unemployment rate, the employment rate, the percentage of
workers searching and in training programs and the percentage of workers entitled to each
31type of bene¯t. For the convenience of comparison with other model economies, I normalize
the welfare and output level in the benchmark economy to be 100. As shown in the section
of estimation results, these statistics match fairly well their counterparts in the data.
Reforms 1 and 2 gradually remove the extra bene¯ts (only) for those unemployed workers
in training programs. According to Reform 1, unemployed workers entitled to UA no longer
receive higher bene¯ts in training programs than those who search56 and the maximum UI
duration in training programs decreases from 43 months to 38 months.57 This reduces the
incentive for unemployed workers to participate in training. Therefore, the percentage of
unemployed workers in training decreases by nearly 40 percent (from 0:9 to 0:3 percentage
point). At the same time, the percentage of unemployed workers who search increases from
12:7 to 13:7 percentage points. This has two e®ects on the employment rate. Since workers
have a better chance of ¯nding jobs when they search, it increases the employment rate.
Second, with fewer unemployed workers participating in training, the proportion of low-skilled
unemployed workers increases. Since low-skilled unemployed workers have lower probability
of ¯nding good jobs (i.e., jobs with high wage earnings), it reduces the transition rate from
unemployment to employment.58 This reduces the employment rate. Taking into account
these two e®ects, Reform 1 reduces the employment rate by 0:2 percentage point. The
unemployment rate increases by 0:6 percentage point. The percentage of workers who search
increases by 0:6 percentage point.59 The output (i.e., the total wage earnings in the economy)
decreases by 1:0 percentage point due to the decrease in average productivity.
Similarly, since Reform 2 further reduces the maximum duration of UI entitlement from 38
months to 19 months for unemployed workers in training programs,60 workers are less likely
to participate in training. As a result, in the long run the percentage of training workers is
only 30 percent of the benchmark level. The unemployment rate goes up to 13:5 percentage
points. Notice that the employment rate doesn't change. This is because the two e®ects of
more search workers on the employment rate (as discussed above) o®set each other in this
case. But the output falls by another 0:7 percentage point because the workers' productivity
further goes down when even fewer workers choose training.
Reforms 1 and 2 together actually remove all the extra bene¯ts for unemployed workers in
training programs. So unemployed workers face the same bene¯t structure no matter whether
they participate in training or not. Reform 3 (in 2006) further reduces the maximum duration
of the UI bene¯t from 19 months to 13:5 months. And the target is all the unemployed
workers (not just those workers in training programs as in Reforms 1 and 2). This actually
generates completely di®erent results from those in the ¯rst two reforms. As shown in the ¯fth
56Before 2003, unemployed workers entitled with UA may receive higher levels of bene¯ts if they participate
in training.
57The actual reform is that the UI bene¯t duration will be reduced by half of the training programs duration.
Thus, the maximum UI bene¯t duration is given by 19 £ 2 = 38 months under Reform 1.
58Since wage earning is given by the product of the wage rate (per unit of human capital) and the worker's
human capital and workers face the same wage rate distribution, a low-skilled worker is less likely to ¯nd jobs
with high wage earnings.
59Again, notice that the increase in the percentage of workers who search is more than the decrease in the
percentage of workers who participate in training.
60Therefore, participating in training doesn't extend the maximum duration of UI entitlement. In other
words, workers in training programs have the same maximum duration of UI bene¯t entitlement as those who
search.
32column of Table 8, compared with the benchmark economy, it almost doubles the percentage
of workers in training programs. The unemployment rate decreases by 1:3 percentage points
and the employment rate increases by 0:2 percentage point. The output increases by 2:4
percentage points. The tax rate increases because the total expenditure on training costs
increases.
Instead of explaining again what causes these changes separately, I want to point out the
main channel through which di®erent policies a®ect the economy in the model, the trade-
o® between search and training. This helps us to understand why more unemployed workers
choose training under Reform 3 and why Reform 3 has a completely di®erent e®ect on workers'
training participation decisions. The important di®erence between training and search is as
follows. Training takes time to improve human capital. During the training period there
are fewer opportunities for ¯nding a job, which means workers in training programs have to
forgo more labor income. On the contrary, search helps to ¯nd a job faster, but it doesn't
improve human capital (it even depreciates). When the UI bene¯t duration is very long, not
only can unemployed workers receive this generous bene¯t for a very long time, but they also
have enough time to search for good jobs. This makes unemployed workers choose search
even though they know their human capital may depreciate during the search period. As the
duration of UI becomes shorter, more workers begin to participate in training because they
know they can ¯nd good jobs faster after their human capital improves through the training
programs. And this is important to them if they know the period in which they can receive
UI bene¯ts is much shorter than before. This is why the reduction of the UI bene¯t duration
in Reform 3 will push more workers to participate in training.
Thus, the most important thing I want to emphasize is that a worker does not make
decisions on search and training separately. Workers always look at the trade-o® between
training and search to make the best choice. Although like Reform 3, Reforms 1 and 2 also
reduce the maximum UI bene¯t duration, they reduce the number of workers in training
programs because they only reduce the UI bene¯t duration for workers in training programs,
reducing the incentive of training participation. However, Reform 3 reduces the UI bene¯t
duration for all unemployed workers, which in the end \forces" more workers to choose
training, because workers know under the new policy, training becomes more important for
them so they can leave unemployment before their UI bene¯ts expire.
The middle panel of Table 8 also reports the e®ects of these reforms on the percentage
of unemployed workers entitled to each type of bene¯t. Reforms 1 and 2 slightly increase
the percentage of workers entitled to UI and UA, but has almost no e®ect on the percentage
of workers entitled to SA. Reform 3 reduces the percentage of workers entitled to UI while
increasing the percentage of workers entitled to UA and SA. There are several things worthy
of more explanation here. First, the main reason more unemployed workers are entitled to
UI under Reforms 1 and 2 is that there are more low-skilled workers (both employed and
unemployed) because of the low participation in training programs. The increase of low-
skilled employed workers increases the average layo® probability because low-skilled workers
have a greater chance of being laid o®.61 This increases the transition to unemployment and
generates more workers receiving UI. Second, the reason the percentage of workers entitled
to UA does not increase under Reform 1 is that the removal of extra bene¯ts for workers
61As shown in the estimation results, ¸(L) > ¸(H).
33entitled to UA in training programs lowers their reservation wages; thus, workers entitled to
UA leave unemployment faster than the benchmark economy. Third, since Reform 3 reduces
the maximum UI bene¯t duration, it directly reduces the percentage of workers receiving UI
and increases the percentage of workers receiving UA and SA.
7.2 The Transition Dynamics After the Actual Reforms
After investigating the long-run e®ects of these reforms, it is also interesting to look at the
transition path between and after these reforms were implemented in Germany.
The benchmark model is estimated using the German data between 2000 and 2002. The
three reforms took place in 2003 (labeled Reform 1), 2005 (labeled Reform 2) and 2006
(labeled Reform 3), respectively. So, I will start with the benchmark economy and simulate
the transition periods following Reform 1 and including Reforms 2 and 3.
The transition path is simulated in the following way. Let N be the total number of
periods to be simulated.62 Let period t = 1 be the initial period (which is in the benchmark
stationary economy), which is the last period right before Reform 1. So the ¯rst reform (i.e.,
Reform 1) is announced at the beginning of period t = 2. I assume the workers in the model
economy are not aware that the government will announce Reforms 2 and 3 in the future.
Then I simulate the transition path from the initial period to the new stationary economy
under the new policies in Reform 1. Since the model period is one month, the economy will go
along this path until period t = 25, which is the last period before the government suddenly
announces Reform 2. Given the same assumption that workers are not aware of Reform 3, I
simulate the transition path from economy in period t = 25 to the new stationary economy.
And the economy will go along this new transition path until period t = 37, which is the last
period before the government announces Reform 3 at the beginning of period t = 38. Since
Reform 3 is the last reform in the model economy, I simulate the transition path from period
t = 38 until the economy reaches the stationary economy under the new policies in Reform
3. Thus, I get all the transition periods t = 1;2;3;:::;N, which start from the benchmark
economy and include all three reforms. (The detailed algorithm to compute the transition
dynamics is listed in the Appendix.)
The unemployment rate, employment rate and percentage of workers who search and
participate in training along the transition path are shown in Figure 6. It shows that the
unemployment rate keeps rising after Reforms 1 (in 2003) and 2 (in 2005), until Reform 3
(in 2006). It then begins to fall. The employment rate increases slightly right after Reform
1 because the removal of the extra UA bene¯ts for unemployed workers in training programs
lowers their reservation wage and pushes more workers to employment. After several periods,
it begins to fall until 2006. After Reform 3, the employment rate begins to rise again. The
two graphs on the right of the ¯gure show how the percentage of workers who search and
participate in training changes following the reforms.
As a check on the model's performance out of the sample period, I plot the actual un-
employment rates between 2003 and 2008.63 By comparing the simulated path of the unem-
ployment rate shown in Figure 6 with the actual one shown in Figure 7, I ¯nd the model
62I let N be large enough so the simulated period covers the period 2003-2008.
63The actual unemployment rates in the period 2003-2008 are taken from Bundesagentur fÄ ur Arbeit. The
data set I used in this paper, IEBS, does not cover this period.






















































Simulated Transition Periods after the Reforms (year 2003, 2005, 2006)


















Figure 6: This ¯gure shows the unemployment rate, the employment rate, the percentages
of workers who search and participate in training along the transition path following the
Reform 1, 2 and 3 in year 2003, 2005 and 2006. The transition path is simulated under the
assumption that the workers in the model economy are not aware that the government will
announce Reforms j in the future when government announce Reform i (where i = 1;2 and
j > i).
35correctly predicts the pattern of the changes of the unemployment rate between 2003 and
2008: that is, it ¯rst increases after 2003 until 2006 and decreases after that. This suggests
that large-scale labor market reforms can have important e®ects on aggregate outcomes.
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7.3 Assess Alternative Policies
By doing counterfactual experiments, the structural model can be used to assess alternative
policies. Speci¯cally, I ask the following questions. (1) Instead of reducing the maximum
bene¯t duration, what are the e®ects of reducing the level of the unemployment bene¯ts (i.e.,
the replacement ratio) on the aggregate statistics that have been studied above? (2) What
will happen if Germany uses the US bene¯t structure? (3) How do the unemployment rate
and employment rate change if there are no training programs in Germany under the new
policies? I will answer these questions one by one.
7.3.1 Change the Replacement Ratios
Two important aspects of the unemployment bene¯ts are the replacement ratio, which mea-
sures the level of the bene¯t, and the maximum entitlement duration, which measures the
length of the availability of the bene¯t. Since most reforms focus on changing the maximum
duration of the unemployment bene¯t, it is also interesting to explore the e®ects of changing
the replacement ratios.
To be comparable with the benchmark economy, I keep all other features of the bene¯t
structure when I change the replacement ratios in the counterfactual experiments. For ex-
ample, I keep the relative di®erence between the replacement ratio of UI and that of UA.
36So, if the replacement ratio of UI decreases by 5 percentage points, the replacement ratio
of UA also decreases by 5 percentage points so the di®erence between them doesn't change.
In other words, when I reduce the replacement ratio of UI, it reduces the structure of the
unemployment bene¯t (which includes both UI and UA). Also, as in the benchmark model
economy, I still assume workers can get extra bene¯ts when they are in training programs
(i.e., longer duration of UI and higher level of UA).
Figure 8 shows the employment rates, the unemployment rates, outputs, and welfare in
the economies with three di®erent UI replacement ratios (i.e., 53 percent, 63 percent and 73
percent ). At each level of replacement ratio, I let the maximum UI duration vary from one to
25 months. For all three di®erent replacement ratios, employment rates, output, and welfare
decrease as the maximum UI duration increases. Unemployment increases with a maximum
UI duration. But one common and signi¯cant feature of the four pictures is that changing
replacement ratios can generate larger e®ects on these aggregate statistics than does changing
the maximum UI duration. This provides an alternative and important policy suggestion for
Germany. That is, to reduce unemployment and increase employment, Germany can reduce
the level of the unemployment bene¯ts instead of (only) the length of the UI bene¯t.
7.3.2 German Training Programs Plus the U.S. Bene¯t Structure
The United States does not have large training programs such as those in Germany. Also,
the United States has a much tighter unemployment bene¯t structure than that in Germany.
So it's interesting to look at an economy with both the German training programs and the
U.S. bene¯t structure.
The seventh column (labeled \Training U.S.") of Table 8 reports the statistics in such an
economy. The U.S. bene¯t structure is described by a UI replacement ratio of 0:6, maximum
duration of six months, no UA bene¯t, and a SA level equal to 25 percent of average net
wage earning.64 As we can see, the percentage of workers in training programs increases
from 1:3 percent to 3:7 percent. With more workers participating in training programs, the
average productivity increases. The output thus increases by about 10 percentage points. The
unemployment rate falls dramatically from 12:6 percent to 5:3 percent, and the employment
rate also increases by about 5 percentage points. This change on the bene¯t structure sharply
reduces the number of workers receiving UI bene¯ts by more than 50 percent. Since there
is no UA bene¯t, fewer unemployed workers are receiving SA. But the number of workers
receiving SA is less than the total number of workers receiving UA and SA in the benchmark
economy. The higher employment and fewer workers receiving unemployment bene¯ts lead
to a 50 percent cut in the tax rate.
7.4 Economies Without Training Programs
What will happen to the unemployment rate, the employment rate, and output if we take
away the training programs? To answer this question, I compare the di®erent economies of
the case with training programs and the case without training programs.
To follow the discussion in the previous section, I will start with the economy with the
U.S. bene¯t structure and German training programs. Suppose now that training programs
64The SA bene¯t is calibrated by using the bene¯t from the Food Stamp Program in the United States.
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Figure 8: The economies with di®erent replacement ratios. This ¯gure shows the unem-
ployment rates, the employment rates, output and welfare in the economies with di®erent
replacement ratios and maximum UI durations. I set the relative di®erence between the re-
placement ratio of UI and that of UA to the same level in the benchmark economy when I
change the UI replacement ratio. Also, like in the benchmark model economy, I still assume
workers can get extra bene¯ts when they are in training programs (i.e., longer duration of
UI and higher level of UA).
38are not available in this economy. The last column of Table 8 reports the statistics for this
new economy. Compared to the old economy (i.e., the one with the U.S. bene¯t structure and
German training programs), the employment rate doesn't change much. This is because the
U.S. bene¯t structure is already tough (i.e., much shorter UI duration, no UA, and lower SA),
which pushes workers to search hard and lower their reservation wages (compared with the
benchmark economy). This generates the high employment rates in both economies.65 The
unemployment rates di®er because of the di®erences in the percentage of workers in training
programs. But under similar levels of employment, the outputs in the two economies di®er
by 7 percentage points which is quite large. This large di®erence is created by the training
programs. In other words, without training, although the tight bene¯ts can still push workers
to leave unemployment faster (compared to the benchmark economy), the workers are not
compensated for the loss of human capital, which is the most important aspect regarding to
the output. Two more things deserve attention: (1) Without training programs, the tax rate
is much lower because training programs are costly and (2) It may be a little surprising to
see that welfare66 in the new economy (without training programs) is higher than in the old
one ( with training programs). This is mainly because of the lower tax in the economy.
Next, I will look at the economy after Reform 3 is implemented. As I discussed before, by
cutting the maximum UI bene¯t duration for all unemployed workers, Reform 3 successfully
increases the employment rate by 0:3 percentage points and increases the output by 2:4
percentage points compared with the benchmark economy. Now suppose there are no training
programs in this economy. As shown in the sixth column of Table 8, the employment rate is
no more than the level in the benchmark economy, while the output even decreases by 2:3
percentage points. Thus, the success of Reform 3 on increasing the employment and output
of the economy relies on the existence of the training programs.
The general conclusion from the above two counterfactual policy experiments is that in
an economy with a generous bene¯t structure such as that in Germany, the presence of
training programs can increase the employment rate signi¯cantly when government tightens
the bene¯t structure (such as by reducing the maximum UI bene¯t duration in Reform
3). And this additional increase on the employment rate decreases as the bene¯t structure
becomes tighter (such as in an economy with the U.S. bene¯t structure). But in all economies,
training programs signi¯cantly increase the outputs. In addition, since training programs are
costly, the higher tax rates resulting from an increase in the number of training programs has
a negative e®ect on welfare.
7.5 E®ects of Training on Employment Probability and Wage Earnings
Workers with di®erent human capital levels and unemployment bene¯t entitlements make
di®erent training participation decisions. In the long run, training programs can improve
workers' human capital, increasing wage earnings when workers ¯nd a job. Higher human
capital makes it easier for workers to ¯nd good jobs (i.e., the jobs with high-wage earnings,)
which also indirectly increases the employment probability. But training is time consuming,
so in the short run, workers participating in training have fewer opportunities to ¯nd a job.
65That is, the economy with the U.S. bene¯t structure and German training programs and the economy
only with the U.S. bene¯t structure but no German training programs.
66Welfare is calculated as the average lifetime utility for all workers in the economy.
39Therefore, it is interesting to explore how the training programs a®ect unemployed workers'
employment probability and wage earnings over time.
To do this, I simulate the workers' employment probabilities and average wage earnings67
over the next N periods under two di®erent assumptions. First, I simulate these paths
under the assumption that training programs are available to unemployed workers (as in
the benchmark economy). Second, I simulate these paths given that training programs are
suddenly not available. Then I compute the di®erences in employment probability and wage
earnings between these two cases. These di®erences re°ect the e®ects of training programs.
The left two pictures in Figure 9 show the average training e®ects on employment prob-
ability and wage earnings for unemployed workers in training programs. The picture on the
upper left panel shows that when unemployed workers participate in training programs, the
probability of leaving unemployment in the short run is lower (by as much as 5 percentage
points) than if they do not participate in training programs. As times goes on, this di®erence
becomes smaller and smaller and ¯nally becomes positive after about 12 periods. This is be-
cause when more and more unemployed workers in training programs improve their human
capital, they can search more e®ectively and leave unemployment faster than those who did
not participate in training programs. The bottom picture on the left shows the di®erence on
wage earnings for the same group of workers. Compared with the picture on the upper left,
it shows that the positive e®ect on wage earnings is much larger than that on employment
probability. The two pictures on the right panel of the same ¯gure show the average training
e®ects for all unemployed workers. They show a similar shape to the two pictures for training
workers, but the magnitudes are much smaller. This is due to the selection problem. That
is, not all unemployed workers will choose training programs at a given time.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Training programs for unemployed workers are commonly used in OECD countries. By
improving workers' human capital, governments intend to help integrate unemployed workers
back to employment. In several OECD countries such as Germany, they also interact with the
main passive type of labor-market policy, unemployment insurance programs, by providing
unemployed workers longer or higher unemployment compensation in training programs. In
this paper I develop and estimate a structure framework to study the workers' search and
training decisions in an economy with both large active (e.g, training) and passive (e.g.,
unemployment insurance) types of policies. The e®ects of these large-scale, government-
sponsored training programs on the aggregate unemployment rate, employment rate and
output have been studied.
I extend Ljungqvist and Sargent's model (JPE, 1998), in which workers' human capital
varies stochastically (but exogenously) with labor-market experience, by endogenizing work-
ers' training decisions. Training programs provided by the government feature a key trade-o®
with respect to unemployment insurance programs: they o®er more generous replacement
rates but require more time and e®ort to improve workers' skills. Thus unemployed workers
67Since a worker may receive di®erent shocks every period, he may experience di®erent employment and
wage earning paths. The employment probability is calculated as the ratio of employment times in that period
to the total simulated times. The average wage earning for a given period is the average of all realized wage
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Figure 9: This ¯gure shows the average e®ects of training programs on employment proba-
bility and wage earnings for workers in training programs and all unemployed workers.
41with di®erent human capital levels and di®erent bene¯t entitlements make di®erent training,
search, and job acceptance decisions. The variety of choices provides a useful strategy for
identifying key structural parameters of the model through the observed distribution of work-
ers among labor-market status (working, searching and training), labor-market transitions
across these states, and earnings conditional on di®erent labor-market experience.
The Simulated Method of Moments was applied to estimate the model by using a recently
released German administrative data set, the Integrated Employment Biographies Sample
(IEBS), a unique data set that contains detailed information on workers' employment his-
tories, wages and bene¯ts, training participation records, and job-search information. The
estimation results con¯rm an important trade-o® between workers' search and training deci-
sions: while training improves workers' human capital, they had a lower job ¯nding rate and
required higher e®ort. Searching helps unemployed workers ¯nd a job faster, but it is more
di±cult to ¯nd better jobs because of the possible skill depreciation in search periods. The
model is used to study the actual reforms in Germany, and to run a series of counterfactuals.
First, I ¯nd that a reform like the one implemented in Germany in 2005 (which reduced
the extra bene¯ts only for unemployed workers in training programs) decreases training en-
rollment by 69 percent in the long run. More workers search, instead of training, and the
proportion of low-skilled unemployed workers increases. As a result, the unemployment rate
rises by almost one percentage point, while output decreases by 1:7 percentage points. In
contrast, a reform like the one implemented in 2006 (which reduced bene¯t duration for all
unemployed workers) doubles training enrollment in the long run. The unemployment rate
falls by 1:3 percentage points, and output increases by 2:4 percentage points respectively. I
conclude that these two reforms, enacted in Germany within a year, were in marked contrast
with each other.
Second, when I simulate the transition path under back-to-back unexpected reforms in
2003¡2006, the dynamics of the model's unemployment rates between and after these reforms
(2003 ¡ 2008) are very close to the actual path for Germany's unemployment as shown in
the data, suggesting that large-scale labor-market reforms can have important e®ects on
aggregate outcomes.
Third, in a counterfactual experiment in which I model an economy with a German-
training system and a US-like unemployment bene¯t structure, I ¯nd that the unemployment
rate falls by over 7 percentage points with the output increasing by 9:9 percentage points.
Hence, an injection of elements of the U.S. system would greatly enhance the performance of
the German labor market.
Overall, this paper is the ¯rst step toward understanding how training programs a®ect
the aggregate economy in the context of multiple types of interacting labor-market policies.
Thus, it has several possible extensions for future work.
First, in order to focus on the workers' decisions (the supply side), I abstract the demand
side by using an exogenous wage o®er distribution that is ¯xed over time. Considering that
the change in the distribution of workers' skill levels may also change the demand for di®erent
skills on the production side, it is worthwhile to incorporate these equilibrium e®ects on the
demand of skills. In the next stage, I will introduce the standard matching and bargaining
feature into the model to extend it to a general equilibrium framework.68
68For a search-island model with production, see Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
42Second, although it is natural to choose human capital and unemployment bene¯ts as the
two state variables since they are the key elements of the two targeted policies (training and
unemployment insurance programs), the model can be easily extended to incorporate more
heterogeneity. For example, because workers of di®erent ages may have di®erent incentives
to participate in training programs, one interesting extension is to include the age variable.
By including another state variable of age, the model can look at workers' training decisions
over the life cycle. This might also be important if the model is used to analyze long-term
unemployment.
Another possible extension is to assume workers also di®er in other aspects, such as their
innate ability. For example, workers may di®er in their ability to learn new skills. While
workers' human capital varies with their labor-market experience, their innate ability does
not change over time (like a ¯xed e®ect). By introducing this additional variable, it may help
to explain better the heterogeneity of workers' previous wage earnings. It also allows the
researcher to look at some other interesting aspects, such as the relation between education
levels and training participation. All these extensions will be ongoing and future research.
9 Appendix
9.1 Classi¯cation of Di®erent Labor Market States in the Data
The data set used in this paper, Integrated Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS),
is a recently released German administrative data set. It combines spells of the following
four di®erent data sets of the Federal Employment Agency (BA), and thus contains both
unemployment and employment, unemployment insurance, and training information.
² The IAB employment history (BeH), which contains 12,594,862 spells between 1990
and 2003
² The IAB bene¯t recipient history (LeH), which contains 2,388,627 spells between 1990
and 2004
² The participants-in-measures data (MTG), which contains 238,232 spells between 2000
and 2004
² Data on job search originating from the applicants pool database (BewA), which con-
tains 1,828,266 spells between 2000 and 2004
IEBS was constructed by selecting people born on one of eight designated days of the year
from the sample frame, making this data set a representative 2:2 percent sample of the target
population.
The common data period from these four data sets is from January 1, 2000, to December
31, 2003.
To use the data for the estimation, I need to de¯ne the states for each individual in the
data set for every data period. There are three di®erent labor market states in the model:
employment (E), search (S) and training (T). But in the data, a worker can show up in more
(2007).
43than one data set at the same time. For example, a worker may have a minor job when he
is in a training program thus both BeH and MTG simultaneously contain his information in
that period. To tidy up the data for the use of the estimation, I classify the workers' labor
market states in every period according to the following criteria.
a) Whenever a worker has a full-time job,69 I classify his state as employment (E) for that
time.
b) A worker is classi¯ed into search (S) state if he is searching for a job and doesn't show up
in a training program or have a full-time job.70
c) A worker is classi¯ed into training (T) state if he is in a training program and does not
have a full-time job at a given time.
In addition, LeH provides the information as to whether a worker receives any bene¯ts
(UI, UA, SA) or not, and to which type of bene¯t he is entitled. So, taking into account
both a worker's labor market status and his bene¯t entitlement, I can classify the workers
into seven groups: (1) Employment; (2) Search with UI; (3) Search with UA; (4) Search with
SA;71 (5) Training with UI;72 (6) Training with UA;73 (7) Training with SA. Through these
classi¯cations, both the model and the data have the same labor market states and thus the
model is linked to the data to be estimated.
9.2 Computation Algorithm
This appendix describes the algorithm to compute a stationary equilibrium of the model and
the transition dynamics between and following the three reforms.
9.2.1 Computation of the Steady State
The model is a heterogeneous-agent model with workers di®ering in their labor market states,
human capital levels, and bene¯t entitlements. So the solution algorithm is similar to that
which solves the standard Bewley-Aiyagari type of heterogeneous agent models.74
Step 1. Guess a set of value functions for each group of workers (i.e., employed workers,
workers who search with UI, workers who search with UA, workers who search with SA,
workers who participate in training with UI, workers who participate in training with UA,
workers who participate in training with SA) and a tax rate, which government imposes on
employed workers to ¯nance the expenditure on training costs and di®erent bene¯ts.
Step 2. Solve individual problems for each type of workers, derive policy functions, and
update a new set of value functions.
Step 3. Use the policy functions derived in Step 2 and speci¯cations on the exogenous shocks
to construct the transition matrix and compute the invariant distribution ¤.
69In the data set, there is one variable to distinguish a full-time job and a part-time job.
70A worker is said to be searching for a job if BewA has his record at that time.
71Since SA is not contained in LeH, I assume all workers without unemployment bene¯ts receive SA.
72Since the IM bene¯t a worker receives in a training program has the same level of UI bene¯ts (if he is
entitled to UI), Training with UI includes two cases: Training with UI and Training with IM.
73Notice that when a worker is entitled to UA bene¯ts, he may receive higher bene¯t when in a training
program.
74See Aiyagari (1994), Bewley (1977).
44Step 4. Compute the total tax revenue, total expenditure on training programs and di®erent
bene¯ts. Check if the government budget is balanced. If not, adjust the tax rate and go back
to Step 2.
9.2.2 Computation of the Transition Path
The benchmark model is estimated using the German data between 2000 and 2002. The
three reforms took place in 2003 (labeled Reform 1), 2005 (labeled Reform 2) and 2006
(labeled Reform 3), respectively. So, the transition path starts with the benchmark stationary
economy and experiences Reform 1, 2 and 3, until the economy reaches the new stationary
equilibrium which is induced by Reform 3.
I divide the total transition path into three parts: (1) from the benchmark economy
to the period right before Reform 2 is announced, which includes 25 periods,75 (2) from the
period in which Reform 2 is announced to the last period right before Reform 3 is announced,
which includes 12 periods, and (3) from the period in which Reform 3 is announced until
the time the economy reaches the new stationary equilibrium. I assume in each part, the
agents in the economy are not aware that the government will announce new reforms except
the one announced in this part.76 I ¯rst simulate the path from the initial steady state (the
benchmark economy) to the new stationary economy which is induced by Reform 1. Thus
the 25 periods contained in part (1) are given by the ¯rst 25 periods along this path. For
part (2), I use the economy in the last period of part (1) as the initial state and simulate the
transition path from it to the new stationary economy induced by Reform 2. The next 12
periods in part (2) are given by the 2nd period to the 13th period along this path. Finally, I
use the economy in the last period of part (2) as the initial state to simulate the remaining
periods contained in part (3).
So, to ¯nd the transition dynamics in each part, I need to compute the transition path
from the initial state (which is known) to the new stationary equilibrium which is induced by
the new policy announced in that part. Assume that in period 1 the economy is in the initial
state and the new policy is announced and implemented in period 2. The economy reaches
the new stead state in period T. Then, the algorithm to compute the transition path from
period 1 to period T is as follows.
Step 1. Guess the path of tax rates.
Step 2. Use the value functions of the ¯nal steady state for the period T to solve for the
workers' problems backward from period T-1.
Step 3. Use the distribution of the initial state and policy functions from Step 2 to compute
the path of the distribution.
Step 4. Compute the total tax revenue, total expenditure on training programs and di®er-
ent bene¯ts in each transition period. Check if the government budget is balanced in each
transition period. If not, adjust the guessed path of tax rates and go back to Step 2.
75This part includes Reform 1
76This means that agents in the model economy do not know the government will announce Reform i + 1
when government announces Reform i (i = 1;2).
459.3 Estimation Method
To circumvent the computation di±culty from the optimization problem with nonsmooth and
local optima, I apply a recent approach proposed by Chernozhukov and Hong (2005). They
develop a class of Laplace Type Estimators (LTE) which can be implemented by Markov
Chain Monte Carlo simulations. In this appendix, I will describe the details about the
estimation method.
9.3.1 Details about the GMM LTE in CH (2005)
Let £ be the set of parameters to be estimated and µ 2 £ be a particular parameter vector
(L £ 1). Let fm1;m2;:::;mKg be K selected moments from the data (for example, mi can
be the sizes of certain groups, wages earnings conditional on certain labor-market experience
and so on) and f~ m1(µ); ~ m2(µ);:::~ mK(µ)g be the corresponding moments simulated from the
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where gn(µ) is a K £1 vector (m1 ¡ ~ m1(µ);m2 ¡ ~ m2(µ);::;mK ¡ ~ mK(µ))0 and n is the sample
size.
The GMM estimator is therefore the µ 2 £ which maximizes the objective function
Ln(µ). In practice, it is di±cult to ¯nd the maxima when there exist many local maxima
or the objective function is not well behaviored (such as the existence of multiple kinks).
Therefore, this paper uses the Laplace type estimator (LTE) which can be easily computed
through Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation methods.








where pn(µ) is called quasi-posterior in CH's paper. More formally, GMM LTE ^ µ minimizes





with the squared loss function ½n(x) = j
p
nxj2.
Under the assumption 1-4 in the paper, CH (2005) the shows the LTE is asymptotically
equivalent to the GMM extremum estimator.
469.3.2 Estimation Procedure
To implement the estimation, I use Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to simulate the quasi-
posterior distribution. Then the parameter estimator µ is given by the sample mean of this
simulated distribution. The procedure is as follows.
Step 1. Start with an initial parameter vector µ(0). Solve the structural model and construct
the moments f~ m1(µ(0)); ~ m2(µ(0));:::~ mK(µ(0))g based on the generated stationary distribution.
Step 2. Use the simulated moments and data moments to form the GMM objective func-
tion L(µ(0)). (In this paper I use diagonal weighting matrix with speci¯ed weights to each
moments.)
Step 3. Apply Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate 60;000 draws (µ(1);µ(2);:::;µ(60;000)).
² The probability of the move from current (\old") draw µ(i) to the next (\new") draw,
±(µ(i);µ(i+1)), is given by




² The transition kernel, q(µ(i+1)jµ(i)), takes the form of
q(µ(i+1)jµ(i)) = f(jµ(i+1) ¡ µ(i))j)
where f is Gaussian density.
Step 4. The parameter estimator ^ µ then is the mean of the last 50;000 simulated draws (the
¯rst 10;000 draws are in the \burn-in" period).
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